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INTRODUCTION 
Massive piracy and counterfeiting have been perennial problems 
for China. Although these problems existed long before China 
reestablished trade and diplomatic ties with the outside world in the 
late 1970s,1 they continue to haunt China today—even after the 
 
* Copyright © 2011 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and 
Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Wenlan Scholar 
Chair Professor, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. An earlier version of this 
Article was delivered as the keynote opening address at the Oregon Review of 
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their kind invitations and hospitality; Sharon Barner, Mark Cohen, Rob Faris, Eric Priest, 
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1 See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 34–55 (1995) (discussing 
intellectual property problems in the late Qing and Republican periods). 
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country has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 In a recent 
report, the International Trade Commission estimated that “firms in 
the U.S. [intellectual property]-intensive economy that conducted 
business in China in 2009 reported losses of approximately $48.2 
billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR [intellectual 
property right] infringement in China.”3 One therefore cannot help but 
wonder why China remains such a rogue player in the international 
intellectual property arena.4 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, China has been quite compliant 
with international intellectual property norms. Out of the twenty-four 
treaties administered solely by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO),5 China is a member of fifteen6—close to two-
thirds of the total number available for ratification and two more than 
the United States.7 While the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has 
 
2 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON 
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 95 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 NTE REPORT] (noting the 
intellectual property enforcement problems in China). 
3 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUBLICATION NO. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON 
THE U.S. ECONOMY xiv (2011) (internal cross reference omitted), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf. 
4 See James V. Feinerman, Chinese Participation in International Legal Order: Rogue 
Elephant or Team Player, in CHINA’S LEGAL REFORMS 198, 201 (Stanley Lubman ed., 
1996) (asking whether China will be a “rogue elephant” or a team player). 
5 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int 
/treaties/en/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (providing a list of all twenty-four WIPO-
administered treaties). 
6 See discussion infra Part I. The eight agreements to which China is not a signatory 
are: (1) the Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying 
Signals Transmitted by Satellite (“Brussels Convention”); (2) the Hague Agreement 
Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs; (3) the Lisbon Agreement 
for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration; (4) the 
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on 
Goods; (5) the Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol; (6) the Patent 
Law Treaty; (7) the Rome Convention; and (8) the Vienna Agreement Establishing an 
International Classification of the Figurative Elements of Marks. See Contracting Parties, 
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm.jsp?search_what=C (select “China” in 
the “Select Contracting Party” drop-down menu and perform a search) (last visited Oct. 5, 
2011). 
7 Except for the Brussels Convention and the Patent Law Treaty, the United States did 
not sign those WIPO-administered treaties to which China is not a signatory. The United 
States also failed to join three agreements to which China is a signatory: (1) the Locarno 
Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs; (2) the 
Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits; and (3) the 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks. See Contracting 
Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm.jsp?search_what=C (select 
“United States of America” in the “Select Contracting Party” drop-down menu and 
perform a search) (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
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recently found China in violation of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights8 (TRIPS Agreement),9 the 
country quickly remedied the problems by amending both its 
Copyright Law and Customs Regulations.10 China’s quick remedial 
actions stand in sharp contrast to the United States’ continued refusal 
to implement the panel recommendations in two adverse WTO 
decisions concerning the TRIPS Agreement.11 
This Article scrutinizes China’s participation in the international 
intellectual property regime and its role in both the WTO and WIPO. 
Part I discusses China’s engagement with international intellectual 
property norms before its accession to the WTO in December 2001. It 
points out that China is not the “norm breaker” one typically infers 
from its disappointing record of intellectual property protection. 
Instead, the country should be viewed as a “norm taker,” having 
accepted most of the WIPO-administered intellectual property treaties 
available for ratification. 
Parts II to IV identify three distinct phases in which China engages 
with international intellectual property norms following its accession 
to the WTO. These Parts examine in detail the three possible roles 
China can play in this area: (1) norm taker; (2) norm shaker; and (3) 
norm maker.12 These Parts show that, although China began primarily 
 
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
9 See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights ¶ 8.1, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Panel 
Report]. 
10 See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1091–92, 
1097–98 (2011) (discussing the amendments to Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law 
and Article 27 of the Chinese Customs Regulations). 
11 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002); Panel Report, United States—Section 211 
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001); Panel Report, United 
States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000); see also 
Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the United States’ failure to 
implement these panel reports); cf. John H. Jackson, The Impact of China’s Accession to 
the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 19, 28 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM] (“[W]ho says the United States and the European Union are 
always very good citizens? In relation to China’s handling of treaty obligations, China’s 
record is not perfect, but it is also not any worse than that of any of the other WTO 
members.”). 
12 Other commentators have used variations of this quadripartite breaker-taker-shaker-
maker formula to analyze China’s compliance with international economic law or public 
international law. See, e.g., Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance:  
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as a norm taker, it has slowly added the roles of a norm shaker and a 
norm maker in later phases. While China will continue to play 
different roles in the near future, the predominant role it plays will 
vary from phase to phase. This Article concludes with some brief 
observations concerning China’s impact on the future development of 
the international intellectual property regime. 
I 
PRE-WTO ERA 
Commentators have identified three distinct phases in which 
developing countries participated in the international intellectual 
property regime.13 The first phase began during the colonial era, when 
developing countries were still colonies, protectorates, or dependent 
territories of major European powers. By virtue of this subservient 
relationship, developing countries took on obligations accepted by the 
controlling powers.14 Commitments made under such arrangements 
included obligations arising from the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property15 (Paris Convention) and the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works16 (Berne 
Convention), the two cornerstones of the international intellectual 
property regime. 
The second phase began when developing countries adjusted their 
international intellectual property relationship in view of their 
 
From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker and, Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE 
GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011). 
13 See, e.g., CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 34 (2009) (noting that “developing countries participated in the international 
[intellectual property] system through three phases, from the colonial era up until the close 
of the Uruguay Round”); Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual 
Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual 
Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 320–41 (2003) (identifying three 
distinct periods of intellectual property multilateralism: (1) The Era of 
Imperialism/Colonialism, 1500s–1945; (2) The Era of Formalism, 1945–1990s; and (3) 
The Era of Consolidation, 1994–current). 
14 See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 1107–10 (2d ed. 2006) 
(discussing the Berne Convention in relation to foreign colonies, protectorates, and other 
dependent territories); Okediji, supra note 13, at 320–25 (discussing the extension of 
intellectual property obligations from metropolitan states to their colonies). 
15 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967). 
16 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971). 
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newfound independence.17 Such adjustment led to a wide variety of 
pro-development initiatives, such as the drafting of the Protocol 
Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention,18 the 
formation of WIPO as a United Nations specialized agency, the 
establishment of the draft International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology under the auspices of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),19 and efforts to 
revise the Paris Convention.20 
In an earlier article, I described these initiatives collectively as the 
“Old Development Agenda.”21 Although developing countries 
obtained some moderate success with this agenda, the protection of 
their interests remained rather limited. Despite considerable efforts, 
they were unable to adjust protection levels based on their needs, 
interests, conditions, and priorities.22 They also failed to secure more 
transfer of technology and knowledge, and greater protection against 
abuse of rights and restraints on trade. 
The third phase began when developing countries joined their more 
developed counterparts in the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.23 
Many commentators consider this agreement a “sea change” or 
 
17 As Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg recount in relation to the Berne Convention: 
[I]n the years immediately following [World War II], the process of decolonization 
brought into existence a large number of new independent states, notably in Africa 
and Asia. The majority of these had previously been subject to the provisions of the 
Berne Convention as dependent territories of metropolitan states that were 
members of the Berne Union. The question which therefore faced these new states 
was whether they would now continue as members in their own right, or would 
withdraw from the Union. 
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 14, at 885. 
18 Protocol Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967). 
19 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/33 (1981). 
20 See generally Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 465, 468–511 (2009) (providing a detailed discussion of these pro-development 
initiatives). 
21 Id. at 468. 
22 See id. at 477–84 (noting the limited success in efforts to establish the Stockholm 
Protocol to the Berne Convention); id. at 497–505 (noting the limited success in efforts to 
negotiate the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology). 
23 See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 3–27 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the origins and development of the TRIPS 
Agreement); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11–47 (2001) (recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS 
Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
369, 371–79 (2006) (examining four different accounts of the origins of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
214 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 13, 209 
“tectonic shift” in international intellectual property law.24 The 
Agreement’s impact on developing countries is indeed far-reaching. 
For the first time, it introduced comprehensive norms concerning a 
large variety of intellectual property areas in a single multilateral 
agreement.25 Among the rights implicated are copyrights and related 
rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, 
patents, plant variety protection, layout designs of integrated circuits, 
and the protection of trade secrets and other forms of undisclosed 
information.26 
Unlike other developing countries, China’s path of norm 
engagement in the international intellectual property regime did not 
follow these three distinct phases. Such deviation was not caused by 
the incompatibilities between the Confucian culture and intellectual 
property rights, a topic of considerable scholarly interest.27 Instead, 
China’s lack of participation in the international intellectual property 
 
24 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2007) (stating that “[t]he TRIPS 
Agreement represented a sea change in the international regulation of IPRs”); Charles R. 
McManis, Teaching Current Trends and Future Developments in Intellectual Property, 52 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 855, 856 (2008) (noting that “the field of international intellectual 
property law underwent a tectonic shift with the promulgation of the [TRIPS 
Agreement]”). 
25 See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 923, 930–31 (2008). 
26 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 9–39. Because the TRIPS Agreement incorporates by 
reference the Paris Convention, it arguably could implicate rights concerning trade names, 
utility models, and various forms of unfair competition. Id. art. 2.1 (“Members shall 
comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967).”). 
27 See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 1, at 19–29 (discussing how the Confucian culture 
prevented intellectual property protection from taking root in imperial China); Peter K. 
Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure 
the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 16–21 (2001) 
[hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives] (discussing Confucianism as a 
partial impediment to improving intellectual property protection and enforcement in 
China). Although Confucianism has been widely cited in legal literature as an explanation 
for copyright piracy and counterfeiting in China, recent literature and historical and 
empirical evidence suggest that commentators may have overstated the impact of 
Confucianism on China’s reception of international intellectual property norms. See Peter 
K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012); see also Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property: 
What If China Is Not a Born Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341 (questioning the impact 
of Confucianism on intellectual property protection and enforcement in China); Shi Wei, 
Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense?, 32 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 4 (2006) (pointing out that “current mainstream legal 
epistemology incorrectly links China’s enforcement problem to Confucian values”); Peter 
K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 127, 131–34 (2003) (explaining why copyright piracy is not merely a 
cultural problem). 
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arena was the result of autarky and isolationist policies practiced by 
Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders following the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949.28 
Having been born at the end of dynastic rule in imperial China and 
having experienced a long period of exploitation, unfair treatment, 
and humiliation by foreign powers,29 the founding Chinese leaders 
unsurprisingly questioned the legitimacy and expediency of the 
contemporary international legal order.30 At that time, many leaders 
harbored “a burning desire to restore China’s rightful position under 
the sun, to achieve the big power status denied it since the Opium 
War, and to revive the national confidence and self-respect that had 
been lost during a century of foreign humiliation.”31 It is therefore no 
surprise that China declined to actively participate in an international 
regime that demanded the surrender of some of the sovereignty it had 
painfully regained.32 
 
28 See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China 
in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 198 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From 
Pirates to Partners] (“During the Mao era, China made a similar mistake by withdrawing 
completely from the global economy. Practicing self-reliance and import substitution, 
China sought to produce domestically those products it traditionally imported.”); accord 
Feinerman, supra note 4, at 186 (noting China’s “isolation which was by turns self-
imposed and externally enforced”). 
29 See generally IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 139–219, 295–
350, 387–406 (6th ed. 2000) (providing an in-depth discussion of the “century of 
humiliation”). 
30 CHIU HUNGDAH, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 
72–74 (1972) (noting the debate among Communist Chinese writers in the late 1950s over 
the treatment of two separate systems of international law—one bourgeois and the other 
socialist). 
31 HSÜ, supra note 29, at 660–61. 
32 See James Li Zhaojie, Commentary on “China and the International Legal System: 
Challenges of Participation,” in CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW 
CHALLENGES 162, 163 (Donald C. Clarke ed., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S LEGAL 
SYSTEM] (“China’s policy of integrating with the international system . . . follows a 
sovereignty-centered and state-empowering model.”). As one commentator observes, 
China’s effort to manage its engagement with the outside world involves the following 
tensions: 
• To join “the club” of leading nation-states, but on China’s own terms of 
membership; 
• To participate in international “regimes” without sacrificing national 
“sovereignty”; 
• To garner the benefits of advanced technologies without accepting their 
“negative” consequences; 
• To encourage entrepreneurial flair and market flexibility without absorbing the 
materialistic self-indulgence and cultural decadence that seem to come with 
modern capitalism (in short, to take what is deemed “good” from the outside 
world, and to filter out what is “bad”). 
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In the late 1970s, however, China began to realize that the self-
reliance and import substitution policies had left the country 
economically poor and technologically backward.33 As Henry 
Kissinger recounts: “On Mao’s death, America’s total trade with 
China amounted to $336 million, slightly lower than the level of 
America’s trade with Honduras and one-tenth of America’s trade with 
Taiwan, which had approximately 1.6 percent of China’s 
population.”34 
Following Mao’s death and the demise of the infamous Gang of 
Four, Deng Xiaoping and his fellow leaders reopened the country to 
foreign trade.35 In addition to normalizing the country’s diplomatic 
relationships with the outside world,36 China adopted new policies to 
develop world-class strengths in agriculture, industry, science and 
technology, and national defense, known collectively as the “Four 
Modernizations.”37 
To promote trade with the outside world, China and the United 
States signed the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United 
States of America and the People’s Republic of China in 1979.38 
Calling for reciprocal protection of copyrights, patents, and 
trademarks, this agreement “marked the beginning of Western 
intellectual property protection in post-Mao China.”39 Article VI(3) of 
the Agreement provided that “each Party shall seek, under its laws 
and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or 
natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and 
 
Frederick S. Tipson, China and the Information Revolution, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: 
PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 231, 232 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 
1999). 
33 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 198 (“By the late 1970s, China 
had concluded that this self-reliant policy was ineffective. It had led to high-cost, 
ineffective domestic production, and China remained a backward country with limited 
foreign technology and capital.”). 
34 HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 333 (2011). For comparison purposes, the total 
volume of trade between China and the United States amounted to $456.8 billion in 2010. 
US-China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, US-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, 
https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). 
35 See HSÜ, supra note 29, at 858–69 (discussing the “open door” policy adopted in 
December 1978). 
36 See id. at 785–802 (discussing China’s efforts to normalize its diplomatic 
relationships with the outside world). 
37 See id. at 803–14 (discussing the Four Modernizations). 
38 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the 
People’s Republic of China, U.S.-China, July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4652 [hereinafter 1979 
Agreement]. 
39 Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 136. 
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trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark protection 
correspondingly accorded by the other Party.”40 Article VI(5) further 
stipulated that “each Party shall take appropriate measures, under its 
laws and regulations and with due regard to international practice, to 
ensure to legal or natural persons of the other Party protection of 
copyrights equivalent to the copyright protection correspondingly 
accorded by the other Party.”41 
A year after the signing of this agreement, China became a member 
of WIPO.42 In 1982, China promulgated its first trademark law, which 
was followed two years later by a patent law.43 Although a 
contentious debate erupted over the expediency of patent protection 
and the appropriateness of establishing private rights in a socialist 
environment, Chinese leaders eventually concluded that having 
stronger intellectual property protection would be in the country’s 
best interest.44 In 1985, China joined the Paris Convention,45 which 
lays out the international intellectual property norms in both the 
patent and trademark areas. Four years later, China also joined the 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of 
Marks46 (Madrid Agreement), which streamlines the trademark 
application process in member states. 
Compared with patents and trademarks, China’s path to join the 
international copyright family has been much longer and more 
arduous.47 Due in large part to China’s strong information control 
policy48 and its continued reluctance to introduce private rights into a 
socialist environment,49 the country did not establish a new copyright 
 
40 1979 Agreement, supra note 38, art. VI(3). 
41 Id. art. VI(5). 
42 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang 
=en&treaty_id=1 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
43 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 136. 
44 For discussions of the challenges in developing the 1984 Patent Law, see generally 
ALFORD, supra note 1, at 67–74; David Ben Kay, Comment, The Patent Law of the 
People’s Republic of China in Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 331 (1985). 
45 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang 
=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
46 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang 
=en&treaty_id=21 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
47 See ALFORD, supra note 1, at 77 (quoting Wang Hanbin, the vice president of the 
National People’s Congress, as describing the drafting of the 1990 Copyright Law as “the 
most complicated”). 
48 See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 27, at 28–32 (discussing the 
Chinese censorship and information control policy). 
49 See ALFORD, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing the uneasiness of introducing private 
intellectual property rights into a socialist environment). 
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system until the early 1990s.50 Although American firms had been 
fairly patient in the first few years following China’s reopening,51 
they became increasingly concerned about the widespread piracy and 
counterfeiting problems in China. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, these firms began to pressure the U.S. 
government to take more proactive actions to protect their intellectual 
property interests in China.52 The timing of their demands could not 
have been better; the United States already had a huge trade deficit, 
and the industries were working closely with their European and 
Japanese counterparts to push for the establishment of the TRIPS 
Agreement in the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (Uruguay 
Round).53 
On May 19, 1989, amidst student protests in Tiananmen Square, 
China and the United States signed its first ever memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) concerning the protection of intellectual 
property rights.54 Although this MOU called for stronger protection of 
computer software, commentators seldom mentioned this document, 
due largely to the unrelated sanctions the United States and the 
international community imposed on China shortly after the 
Tiananmen incident.55 
 
50 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 141. 
51 See id. at 137 (“In the beginning, the United States was willing to compromise its 
intellectual property rights, because the country was eager to lure China into the ‘family of 
nations.’”). 
52 See Warren H. Maruyama, U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual 
Property, and the Rule of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 165, 186 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (“At a 1985 
meeting to the U.S.-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the U.S. for 
the first time expressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR standards. In 1987, the U.S. put 
IPR protection on the agenda for U.S.-China market access talks.”). 
53 For detailed discussions of the private sector’s active involvement in the 
development of the TRIPS Agreement, see generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002); SUSAN K. SELL, 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (2003). 
54 Memorandum of Understanding Between the People’s Republic of China and the 
United States, U.S.-China, May 19, 1989, reprinted in PRC Agrees to Push for Copyright 
Law that Will Protect Computer Software, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP., July 1989, at 151. 
55 See Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 235 (2006); 
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 186 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]; see also ALFORD, supra note 1, at 121 (criticizing the 
United States for giving more priority to intellectual property protection than to human 
rights protection in negotiating the 1989 MOU). 
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Despite these sanctions and a turbulent relationship with the United 
States,56 China enacted its first Copyright Law in 1990.57 A year later, 
China promulgated a separate set of computer software regulations.58 
Although these enactments succeeded in improving China’s 
relationship with the United States, they were too little, too late for 
American rights holders. 
In April 1991, the United States designated China as a Priority 
Foreign Country through the Section 301 process.59 To increase its 
leverage, the U.S. administration threatened to impose retaliatory 
tariffs of $1.5 billion on Chinese textiles, shoes, electronic 
instruments, and pharmaceuticals.60 China quickly responded with 
countersanctions of a similar amount on American commodities, such 
as aircraft, cotton, corn, steel, and chemicals.61 Hours before the 
deadline for imposing sanctions, both countries averted a potential 
trade war62 by signing a second MOU.63 
Pursuant to this new MOU, China amended both its copyright and 
patent laws.64 China also joined the Berne Convention,65 the Geneva 
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against 
 
56 See ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 42 (2005) (“One outcome of the worldwide condemnation of the 
PRC [following the Tiananmen incident] was that ‘it was impossible to get the USTR to 
even talk to China between June 1989 and autumn 1990.’” (quoting documented but 
undisclosed interview)). 
57 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 141. 
58 See id. 
59 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 1995 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON 
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 47, 54 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 NTE REPORT]. 
60 Sheryl WuDunn, Nonstate Plants in China at Risk in U.S. Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
14, 1992, at A9. 
61 David Holley, China Warns of Trade War with U.S. over Patents, Copyrights, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at A6. 
62 Stuart Auerbach, China, U.S. Reach Trade Accord; Beijing Agrees to Curb Piracy of 
Products, Safeguarded Material, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1992, at A24; Keith Bradsher, 
U.S. and China Reach Accord on Copying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at D1. 
63 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 
1992, U.S.-China, T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995). 
64 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 142. “The amended copyright 
statute protects computer software programs as literary works for fifty years; removes 
formalities on copyright protection; and extends protection to all works originating in a 
Berne Convention country, including sound recordings in the public domain.” Id. at 143. 
“The new patent law extends the duration of patent protection from fifteen to twenty 
years; affords protection to all chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and 
agrichemical products; and sharply restricts the availability of compulsory licenses.” Id. at 
142. 
65 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang 
=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
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Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms66 (Phonograms 
Treaty), and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).67 After a decade of 
reforms following the reopening of its market, China finally became a 
member of the international copyright family. 
Although the U.S.-China intellectual property relationship 
improved considerably following the signing of the second MOU, the 
relationship quickly deteriorated. On June 30, 1994, the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) again designated China as a Priority 
Foreign Country through the Section 301 process.68 The next year, the 
U.S. administration threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on over 
$1 billion worth of Chinese imports, ranging from plastic picture 
frames to cellular telephones.69 In retaliation, China issued a counter-
threat of 100 percent tariffs on American-made compact discs, 
cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and other products.70 China also 
announced its intention to suspend negotiations with American 
automakers over the creation of joint ventures in China for 
manufacturing minivans and passenger cars, one of the top trade 
priorities of the Clinton administration.71 
As with the encounter three years ago, China and the United States 
again reached an agreement in the eleventh hour.72 With a repeat 
pattern and another follow-up “agreement” in 1996,73 the back and 
forth negotiations between the two countries have created what I have 
described as the “cycle of futility.” In this cycle, China and the United 
 
66 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang 
=en&treaty_id=18 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
67 Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang 
=en&treaty_id=6 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
68 1995 NTE REPORT, supra note 59, at 54. 
69 Martha M. Hamilton, U.S. to Hit China with Stiff Tariffs, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1995, 
at A1. 
70 Id. 
71 David E. Sanger, President Imposes Trade Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at A1. 
72 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, U.S.-China, 34 
I.L.M. 881 (1995). This agreement appeared in the form of an “exchange of letters” with 
an attached action plan. 
73 Trade Compliance Center, People’s Republic of China Implementation of the 1995 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement—1996 (June 17, 1996), available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005361.asp. This 
“agreement” appeared in the form of a report on intellectual property enforcement actions 
China conducted based on the 1995 Agreement. “The document included neither 
significant new terms [in the intellectual property area] nor terms that improved market 
access of American products; instead, it merely reaffirmed China’s commitment to protect 
intellectual property rights made under the intellectual property agreement signed the year 
before.” Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 187. 
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States “repeatedly threatened each other with trade wars, only to back 
down in the eleventh hour with a compromise that did not provide 
sustained improvements in intellectual property protection.”74 
While this futile cycle had undercut the efforts by the U.S. 
government to strengthen intellectual property protection in China, 
the latter did not slow down its participation in the international 
intellectual property regime. By the end of the 1990s, China had 
joined the Nice Agreement Concerning the International 
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the 
Registration of Marks (Nice Agreement), the Budapest Treaty on the 
International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure (Budapest Treaty), the Protocol 
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol), the Locarno Agreement 
Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs 
(Locarno Agreement), the Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the 
International Patent Classification (Strasbourg Agreement), and the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV Convention) (See Table 1). China had also joined the 
Trademark Law Treaty, which still has not entered into force. It even 
signed the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits (Washington Treaty). Although that treaty has 
 
74 Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property 
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 904 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners II]. As I described earlier: 
That cycle went as follows: The United States began by threatening China with 
trade sanctions (often with an ancillary threat of nonrenewal of China’s most-
favored-nation status). China responded with threats of retaliatory sanctions of a 
similar amount. After several months of negotiations, both countries agreed to an 
eleventh-hour compromise that usually led to a written document. While 
intellectual property protection improved during the first few months immediately 
following the agreements, piracy and counterfeiting problems worsened once 
international attention was diverted. Within a short period of time, American 
businesses again complained to the U.S. government, and the cycle repeated itself. 
Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO 
China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 149 (2005); 
see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 28, at 140–48 (discussing this “cycle of 
futility”). 
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since been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement,75 its obsolescence 
has made it difficult to obtain the needed ratifications.76 
 
TABLE 1. List of international treaties to which China has become a 
signatory 
 
06/03/1980     WIPO Convention (in force) 
03/19/1985     Paris Convention (in force) 
10/04/1989     Madrid Agreement (Marks) (in force) 
05/01/1990     Washington Treaty (signed, but not ratified) 
10/15/1992     Berne Convention (in force) 
04/30/1993     Phonograms Convention (in force) 
01/01/1994     Patent Cooperation Treaty (in force) 
08/09/1994     Nice Agreement (in force) 
10/28/1994     Trademark Law Treaty (signed, but not in force) 
07/01/1995     Budapest Treaty (in force) 
12/01/1995     Madrid Protocol (in force) 
09/19/1996     Locarno Agreement (in force) 
06/19/1997     Strasbourg Agreement (in force) 
04/23/1999     UPOV Convention (in force) 
01/29/2007     Singapore Treaty (signed, but not in force) 
06/09/2007     WIPO Copyright Treaty (in force) 
06/09/2007     WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (in force) 
 
Source: Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm 
.jsp?search_what=C (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
 
In sum, before its accession to the WTO, China had signed most of 
the WIPO-administered treaties available for ratification. Out of all 
the treaties the United States had joined at that time, the only 
agreement China failed to sign was the Brussels Convention Relating 
to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by 
 
75 See TRIPS Agreement art. 35 (“Members agree to provide protection to the layout-
designs (topographies) of integrated circuits . . . in accordance with Articles 2 through 7 
(other than paragraph 3 of Article 6), Article 12 and paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits . . . .”). 
76 Cf. Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years After the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act: Is International Protection Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049, 
1052 (2000) (“[B]y the time [provisions protecting integrated circuit layouts] were in 
place, they were largely obsolete.”); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the 
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 378 (2004) (noting 
that the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act “was arguably obsolete by the time it 
was enacted”). 
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Satellite.77 Meanwhile, China had joined the Madrid Agreement, the 
Locarno Agreement, and the Washington Treaty—three agreements 
the United States still has not joined.78 Thus, as far as treaty 
membership is concerned, China is not a rogue player but a rather 
good citizen in the international intellectual property regime. 
II 
PHASE 1: TAKER 
A.  China as a Norm Taker 
At the turn of this millennium, China actively revamped its 
intellectual property system, in part to prepare for its accession to the 
WTO.79 The country amended its patent law in 2000 and its copyright 
and trademark laws the year after.80 Although many of these 
“millennium amendments” were introduced as a response to the 
rapidly changing socio-economic and technological conditions in 
China, they also helped the country meet the standards required by 
the WTO.81 
 
77 See supra note 6. 
78 See supra note 7. 
79 As Xue Hong and Zheng Chengsi declare: 
In general, China’s entry to the WTO significantly influenced the speed and scope 
of the development of the Chinese IP [intellectual property] law system. It is 
interesting to note that IP rights reforms kept pace with Chinese WTO negotiations. 
When the negotiations encountered obstacles, the IP rights reform slowed down; 
when the negotiations reached agreements to promote the accession process, the IP 
rights reform accelerated noticeably. Since China has become a member of the 
WTO, Chinese IP law reform has also peaked. 
XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY xxxix (2002). 
80 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Nov. 1, 
2001); Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Aug. 25, 2000, effective July 1, 
2001); Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Dec. 1, 
2001). 
81 As I wrote earlier: 
 While the amendments were undeniably introduced at a time when China 
prepared to enter the WTO, it is an overstatement, or a half-truth, to claim that the 
amendments were introduced primarily to conform the Chinese intellectual 
property system to WTO standards. Such a statement would ignore the important 
changes in the socialist market economy, the internal dynamics of the intellectual 
property lawmaking process, and contributions of the local stakeholders in the legal 
reforms. 
Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 74, at 914. 
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During the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, 
China was finally admitted to the international trading body.82 After 
fifteen years of arduous negotiations, the country formally became the 
WTO’s 143rd member on December 11, 2001.83 As part of its entry 
price, China took on not only obligations under the TRIPS Agreement 
but also additional WTO-plus commitments.84 As a result, in the first 
few years following the accession, China focused its attention, 
energy, and resources primarily on playing the role of a norm taker—
a role it has assumed and excelled at long before it joined the WTO. 
In ensuing years, however, China slowly changed its approach to 
participation in the WTO. Such a change could be attributed to a large 
number of factors, including: a growing familiarity with WTO rules 
and procedures; a considerable increase in economic strength, 
industrial and scientific prowess, and research capabilities; more 
willingness to take on the role of a major power; greater success in 
resolving WTO-related problems within the country; and a new 
leadership and changing domestic elite politics. This Part focuses on 
the first phase of China’s norm engagement, while the next two will 
discuss the two later phases. 
In Phase 1, China’s approach was similar to the approach it took 
before the WTO accession. Acting primarily as a norm taker,85 the 
 
82 See Symposium, China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter China and the WTO] (remarks of the Author). 
83 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto 
_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
84 See Samuel S. Kim, China in World Politics, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A 
REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 37, 49 (Barry Buzan & 
Rosemary Foot eds., 2004) [hereinafter DOES CHINA MATTER?] (“In a few important 
areas, China assumed obligations that exceed normal WTO standards—the so-called 
WTO-plus commitments.”); Julia Ya Qin, China, India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 167, 173–75 (Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010) (outlining China’s “‘WTO-plus’ rules”). 
85 See, e.g., Margaret M. Pearson, China in Geneva: Lessons from China’s Early Years 
in the World Trade Organization, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA’S 
FOREIGN POLICY 242, 242 (Robert S. Ross & Alastair Iain Johnston eds., 2006) (“The 
evidence . . . suggests that China is far from revisionist. Rather, for the most part, China 
has been a system maintainer, the exception being its behaviour on issues seen to impinge 
on its sovereignty and dignity.”). It is worth noting that China plays the role of a norm 
taker in a more nuanced fashion. As Pitman Potter describes, China takes the norms by 
engaging in “selective adaptation” based on local conditions: 
 Applied to China, selective adaptation analysis permits understanding of local 
responses to international legal obligations. China’s interpretation and 
implementation of international agreements in trade, such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and agreements associated with the . . . 
WTO . . . , for example, will depend on the extent to which interpretive 
communities—comprising government officials, socio-economic and professional  
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country kept a rather low profile in the international intellectual 
property arena.86 For example, when Brazil and Argentina made their 
now famous proposal for the establishment of the WIPO 
Development Agenda,87 China declined to join them, even though it 
arguably was one of the major leaders in the developing world. 
Likewise, when developed countries advanced their proposals for 
higher enforcement standards at the Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council), China’s 
protests were limited to the rejection of the developed countries’ 
proposals and additional interventions explaining why enforcement 
discussions in the Council would be inappropriate or 
 
elites, and other privileged groups exercising authority borne of political and/or 
professional position, specialized knowledge, and/or socio-economic status—
assimilate norms of trade liberalization. 
 Influenced by their training and education, members of China’s interpretive 
communities bring their perceptions about international law and relations to bear in 
responding to the requirements of international rule regimes. Perceptions 
contrasting China’s colonial past and resulting weakness in foreign relations with 
its current strengths tend to encourage both a sense of grievance and of 
opportunities for correction and redress. Perception dynamics are also evident in 
academic and policy assessments of the international legal system that 
acknowledge the challenges posed by globalization for sovereignty imperatives of 
the nation-state generally, and focus on the intrusive nature of international regimes 
whose underlying norms are seen as a challenge to China. Such perceptions affect 
the reception of international legal standards by local interpretive communities, and 
ultimately China’s responses of implementation. 
Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Participation, 
in CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 32, at 145, 147–48 (footnotes omitted); accord 
Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The Development of the Intellectual 
Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 118–19 (2009) (discussing the stage of 
“selective arrangement in light of domestic development”); see also Tipson, supra note 
32, at 232 (“Th[e] attempt to borrow selectively from outsiders is a familiar one in 
Chinese history.”). 
86 Cf. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
224 (2008) [hereinafter BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE] (“To date . . . , China’s interest 
in keeping a relatively low profile, focusing inward, and reassuring the world about the 
implications of its rise has led to a reluctance to take the lead in developing new global 
institutions or challenging old ones for fear of attracting unwanted attention and taking on 
new responsibilities that will create unnecessary distractions for itself.”); KISSINGER, 
supra note 34, at 490 (“Beijing’s initial approach to the new era [presided by the fourth-
generation leadership] was largely incremental and conservative. . . . Its foreign policy 
avoided dramatic moves, and its chief policymakers responded circumspectly to appeals 
from abroad for China to play a more visible international leadership role.”). 
87 WIPO, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11 
(Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ga_31 
/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. 
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counterproductive.88 China even balked when the United States 
proposed to “issue a joint statement [with China] in support of the 
Doha agenda.”89 
While policymakers, industries, and commentators at this stage had 
questioned China’s compliance with its WTO obligations at times,90 
there was no denying that China actively undertook reforms to 
facilitate greater compliance with WTO norms. Most Chinese 
officials also subscribed to the view that joining the WTO was a long 
and complicated process that required a lot of learning and continued 
improvement even after the accession.91 
Similar to the first few years of China’s reopening in the late 
1970s, the United States and its industries were rather patient. Despite 
industry complaints through the Section 301 process,92 the United 
States did not put China back on to the Priority Watch List until after 
April 2005, more than two years after the accession.93 As the USTR 
acknowledged in the 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers, “China has made significant progress in its 
efforts to make its framework of laws, regulations and implementing 
rules WTO-consistent, [although] serious problems remain, 
particularly with China’s enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.”94 
 
88 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 514–15 
(2011) (recounting China’s strong opposition to enforcement-related discussions at the 
TRIPS Council). 
89 Qin, supra note 84, at 188. 
90 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 74, at 904. 
91 See Pearson, supra note 85, at 257 (“With regard to China’s potential for leadership, 
Chinese diplomats have on most issues adopted a learning posture.”); see also Li Yahong, 
The Wolf Has Come: Are China’s Intellectual Property Industries Prepared for the WTO?, 
20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 77, 104 (2002) (quoting Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Chinese 
Economists Fear Favored West May Threaten Sovereignty, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Nov. 13, 2001) (describing the concern of Long Yongtu, the chief negotiator for China’s 
entry into the WTO, that “[l]acking expertise and professionals qualified on international 
rules may make China[] . . . ‘a blind man riding a blind horse’ within the WTO”). 
92 See generally Joe Karaganis & Sean Flynn, Networked Governance and the USTR, in 
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING GOODS 75 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (critically evaluating 
the USTR’s Section 301 process); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual 
Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994) 
(discussing the operation of the Section 301 process and its relation to U.S. trade 
negotiations). 
93 See USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW RESULTS 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005 
_Special_301/asset_upload_file195_7636.pdf. 
94 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 95; see also Massey, supra note 55, at 232 
(“Today, after four bilateral US-China agreements on IPR protection (1989, 1992, 1995, 
and 1996) and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization . . . , piracy in China is  
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To be certain, by acceding to the WTO, China took on new 
obligations concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement, for example, contains twenty-one 
articles laying out the WTO-wide intellectual property enforcement 
norms.95 Nevertheless, the vague, broad, and ambiguous nature of 
these norms96 has made it difficult for the USTR to challenge China’s 
WTO compliance on enforcement grounds.97 That challenge was 
further exacerbated by the moratorium on non-violation complaints,98 
which has been in force since the inception of the international 
trading body.99 
 
no longer primarily the result of the Beijing government’s own actions. Rather, the major 
continuing issue has been Beijing’s failure to get its laws and international obligations 
adequately and effectively enforced.” (footnotes omitted)). 
95 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41–61. 
96 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, supra note 88, at 495 (“[T]he TRIPS 
Agreement now contains many result-oriented terms that are vague, broad, and undefined. 
Examples of these terms are ‘“effective”, “reasonable”, “undue”, “unwarranted”, “fair and 
equitable”, and “not . . . unnecessarily complicated or costly.”’” (quoting UNCTAD–
ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 576 (2005))). 
97 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 74, at 931–38 (discussing the 
difficulties of challenging China before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on 
enforcement grounds). 
98 Commentators have noted the usefulness of non-violation complaints for launching a 
WTO challenge against China based on inadequate enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. See Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of 
Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023, 1059 (2009) (“Given the lack of detail 
in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more of a non-violation 
complaint. The essence of what the USA was really complaining about was that a benefit 
it expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels of enforcement.”); Daniel 
Stewart & Brett G. Williams, The Impact of China’s WTO Membership on the Review of 
the TRIPs Agreement, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 
363, 367 (“On the basis of the possibility of claims on enforcement issues, one may expect 
that China will join those countries which seek an extension of the moratorium on non-
violation complaints.”); see also Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 549 
(2009) (noting that the WTO panel’s analysis in China may have “blurred both the 
traditional distinction between ‘as such’ and ‘as applied’ claims and the line separating 
TRIPS violations from non-violations”). 
99 Non-violation complaints provide WTO members with a helpful recourse against the 
impairment of benefits in the event that a WTO member is unable to show any substantive 
violation. Instead of focusing on the legality of a contested measure, this type of complaint 
allows countries to focus on “the protection of expectations arising from reciprocal tariff 
and market access concessions (in the GATT context) or from a Member’s specific 
commitments (in the GATS context).” UNCTAD–ICTSD, supra note 96, at 655. 
Nevertheless, due to the unprecedented nature of using the trade-based dispute settlement 
process in the intellectual property context, a moratorium has been imposed on non-
violation complaints since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. See Peter K. Yu, The 
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1029–30 
(2009); William New & Catherine Saez, Multilateral Trading System Under Scrutiny at  
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Moreover, the U.S. administration understood the importance of 
providing China with the time and wiggle room needed to conform its 
system to WTO norms. Given the substantial changes China had 
already undertaken in the run-up to the WTO accession,100 an 
impatient push for greater reforms that ignored China’s resources and 
institutional capacities would have been counterproductive anyway. 
Such a push was unlikely to result in meaningful protection to 
intellectual property rights holders. In fact, greater patience could 
have served the United States’ long-term interests in promoting free 
trade by providing China with the needed guidance as it made a 
transition to full compliance with WTO rules.101 
To complicate matters even further, in the first few years of 
China’s WTO membership, the world was still recovering from the 
aftermath of the U.S. terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. At that 
time, the WTO was also undergoing a period of adjustment and soul-
searching following the launch of the Doha Development Round of 
Trade Negotiations (Doha Round).102 In the same ministerial 
conference that admitted China to the international trading body, the 
WTO members adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health103 (Doha Declaration). Paragraph 6 of the Declaration 
specifically instructed the TRIPS Council to devise an “expeditious 
solution” to enable countries with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity to import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals.104 
In addition, Paragraph 7 extended the formal introduction of patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals and of protection for undisclosed 
clinical trial data to January 1, 2016.105 
A few years later, shortly before the Sixth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong, the WTO members further extended the 
transitional period for all TRIPS obligations to July 1, 2013, for those 
 
WTO Ministerial, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org 
/weblog/2009/11/30/multilateral-trade-system-under-scrutiny-at-wto-ministerial/. 
100 See Shi Guangsheng, Introduction: Working Together for a Brighter Future Based 
on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 15, 15 (Henry Gao & Donald 
Lewis eds., 2005) (“After joining the WTO, China first and foremost sorted out over 2,300 
laws and regulations nationwide.”). 
101 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 74, at 942–45 (noting China’s need 
for guidance as it made a transition to full compliance with WTO rules). 
102 See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 20, at 512–15 (discussing 
the Doha Round). 
103 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002). 
104 Id. ¶ 6. 
105 Id. ¶ 7. 
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least developed countries that had yet to meet the stated 
requirements.106 That extension provided these poor countries with an 
additional transitional period of seven and a half years. Building on 
efforts facilitated by the Doha Declaration, developing countries also 
successfully pushed for the adoption of a protocol to formally amend 
the TRIPS Agreement by introducing a new Article 31bis.107 If 
ratified by two-thirds of the WTO membership,108 the amendment 
will enter into effect. The new provision will likely increase the 
access to essential medicines in the developing world. 
B.  A Low Profile 
Given China’s considerable struggle with the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, it is easy to understand 
why the country accepted the role of a norm taker, rather than a norm 
shaker or a norm maker. Interestingly, China’s norm taker role was 
not limited to the international intellectual property area. Except for 
some sensitive areas, where sovereignty was involved, China has 
consistently assumed a low profile in international regimes and 
multilateral organizations. Thus, apart from its continued struggle 
with piracy and counterfeiting, China’s behavior in this phase can be 
attributed to several additional factors. 
First, the primary focus of the Chinese leadership is domestic, 
rather than international.109 Since its accession to the WTO, China has 
experienced a large number of domestic problems, including 
decreasing control by the state, decentralization of the central 
government, significant losses suffered by inefficient state-owned 
enterprises, a widening gap between the rich and the poor and 
between urban and rural areas, massive urban migration, widespread 
and massive unemployment, rampant corruption, and growing unrest 
 
106 Press Release, WTO, Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply Intellectual 
Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e 
/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm. 
107 General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt1641_e.htm; see also Peter K. 
Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 872–86 (2007) (discussing 
the origins and content of the proposed Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement). 
108 As of this writing, slightly more than a third of the 153 WTO member states, 
including the United States, India, Japan, China, and members of the European Union, 
have ratified the proposed amendment. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, WTO (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e 
/amendment_e.htm. 
109 See ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINA’S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES AND PERILS 53 (2005). 
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in both the cities and the countryside.110 Compared with these 
domestic problems, intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting 
was not of a sufficiently high priority on the national policy agenda. 
As Robert Sutter explains, against a background of social and 
economic uncertainties brought about by China’s accession to the 
WTO, the Asian financial crisis, and growing political dissent, 
“foreign affairs generally remained an area of less urgent policy 
priority.”111 This approach can be traced back to Beijing’s gradual 
shift in focus in the past three decades away from policies dominated 
by political ideologies, anti-imperialism activities, support for armed 
insurgencies, and export of Maoism.112 Today, China’s policies have 
“a more pragmatic orientation that place[s] priority on raising the 
living standards of the Chinese people and building up China’s 
comprehensive national power through economic development.”113 
As a result of these policy priorities, China kept a rather low 
profile in the WTO, regardless of whether the issue concerned 
intellectual property protection or dumping. As Professor Gao 
observes, “[b]e it in the informal green room meetings, the formal 
meetings of the various committees and councils or the grand sessions 
of the Ministerial Conferences, China has generally been reticent.”114 
According to Professor Gao, keeping such a low profile in the WTO 
could be beneficial to China, at least in the first few years of its 
accession: 
As a newly-acceded Member, China is required to undertake a lot 
of commitments, many of which are more onerous than those of 
existing WTO members. It is already a humongous challenge for 
China to try to implement these commitments. After having been in 
the spotlight for fifteen years, what China needs now is some quiet 
breathing space. Shouldering a leadership role would put China 
 
110 See China and the WTO, supra note 82, at 3. 
111 SUTTER, supra note 109, at 53. 
112 See David Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early 
Twenty-First Century [hereinafter Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom?], in 
POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA’S NEW DYNAMICS 23, 24 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter POWER SHIFT]. 
113 C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD 
NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 120 (2006) [hereinafter 
BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET]. 
114 Henry S. Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 69 (2007) [hereinafter Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO]; accord 
Pearson, supra note 85, at 242 (“Beijing is in no great hurry to take on a central leadership 
role in the WTO, despite willingness to posture on some issues.”); Qin, supra note 84, at 
188 (“Although China . . . has voiced its support for the developing country members on 
most of the issues, it has shunned taking any leadership role.”). 
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back on the front stage again and encourage other Members to 
pressure China to make more concessions.115 
Second, China was cognizant of the need to cultivate goodwill 
among its neighbors and to respond to concerns about the security and 
economic threats that had emerged as a result of its rise in power.116 
From developing concepts such as “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) and 
“peace and development,”117 to the emphasis on the need to develop a 
harmonious, multipolar world,118 to the establishment of “early 
harvest programs” in bilateral and regional trade agreements to 
benefit less powerful neighbors,119 Chinese leaders were eager to 
“reassure the world that [China would] pursue a different 
development path than did Germany and Japan in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries—a path based not on aggressive 
changes to the international order, but instead on benevolent 
principles of mutual benefit.”120 
To a great extent, the active development of the “benevolent 
power” image by the present Chinese leadership reminds one of Deng 
Xiaoping’s plea for practicing self-restraint in the early 1990s. As he 
reportedly said after the Tiananmen incident: “[W]atch and analyze 
developments calmly; secure our own positions; deal with change 
with confidence; conceal our capacities; be good at keeping a low 
profile; never become the leader.”121 
 
115 Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO, supra note 114, at 70. 
116 For discussions of the so-called China threat, see generally CHINA’S FUTURE: 
CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted Galen Carpenter & James A. Dorn 
eds., 2000); BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC TARGETS 
AMERICA (2000); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA’S PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA 
AND THE WORLD (2000); PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS: WHERE THEY 
WILL BE FOUGHT AND HOW THEY CAN BE WON (2007). 
117 Kurt M. Campbell, Foreword to CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING’S 
STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ix, x (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD]. 
118 See BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 129; KISSINGER, 
supra note 34, at 500. 
119 See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 996–97, 
1007–08 (2011). 
120 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 121; see also 
Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom?, supra note 112, at 29–41 (discussing factors 
affecting Beijing’s new proactive diplomacy around its periphery). See generally STEVE 
CHAN, CHINA, THE US AND THE POWER-TRANSITION THEORY: A CRITIQUE (2008) 
(explaining why China is unlikely to provoke the United States despite its rising power). 
121 Teng Chung-chian, Hegemony or Partnership: China’s Strategy and Diplomacy 
Toward Latin America, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 117, at 84, 
88 (“[W]atch and analyze developments calmly [lengjing guancha]; secure our own 
positions [chenzhuo yingfu]; deal with change with confidence [wenzhu zhenjiao]; conceal  
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Like Deng, Chinese leaders have stated frequently and explicitly 
that China is not interested in achieving “regional hegemony or 
international leadership (except perhaps in the context of promoting 
the interests of the developing world).”122 According to Wen Jiabao, 
the current Chinese premier, China is more correctly seen as “a 
friendly elephant”123 (youhao de daxiang)—a well-crafted image that 
is appropriate for a “status quo power” that poses no threat to its 
neighbors despite its enormous size.124 It is therefore, no surprise that 
China was somewhat reluctant to develop a higher profile in the 
international intellectual property regime. 
Third, while China was undergoing rapid economic transformation, 
it experienced corresponding transformation in the political arena. 
The political makeup of China’s top leadership today is somewhat 
different from what it was during the country’s formative years. At 
that time, Mao Zedong and, later, Deng Xiaoping were China’s 
paramount leaders; the decision-making process was highly 
centralized. 
By the time the third- and fourth-generation leadership emerged—
with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao at the helm, respectively—the 
decision-making process had become more decentralized. As a result, 
leaders could not ignore the political implications of their policies. 
 
our capacities [taoguang yanghui]; be good at keeping a low profile [shanyu shouzhuo]; 
never become the leader [juebu dantou].”). In the context of China’s foreign policy, the 
oft-misinterpreted phrase “taoguang yanghui” has been particularly controversial. See 
Verna Yu, “China Threat” Hangs on a Phrase, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 2010, at 
4. 
122 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 121; see also William 
W. Keller & Thomas G. Rawski, Asia’s Shifting Strategic and Economic Landscape, in 
CHINA’S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 3, 6 (William W. Keller & 
Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007) (“Some may suggest that China’s policy of economic 
engagement and commercial diplomacy in Asia is merely tactical, a ‘charm offensive’ 
designed to buy time until China is economically and militarily powerful enough to exert 
regional hegemony.”); Robert I. Rotberg, China’s Quest for Resources, Opportunities and 
Influence in Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 1, 2 (Robert I. 
Rotberg ed., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA INTO AFRICA] (“Despite what Washington may 
believe, China is not using its engagement with Africa primarily to humble the United 
States or Europe, or to score political points in the ongoing battle for global hegemony.”); 
Xiang Lanxin, An Alternative Chinese View, in CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE: IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES 44, 44 
(Riordan Roett & Guadalupe Paz eds., 2008) (“[I]n Washington there is a growing 
suspicion that China has a well-thought-out design or grand strategy to undermine the 
traditional U.S. dominance in [Latin America]. In reality, however, China has yet to define 
the nature of its relationship with [the region].”). 
123 DAVID C. KANG, CHINA RISING: PEACE, POWER, AND ORDER IN EAST ASIA 131 
(2007). 
124 Id. at 80. 
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While intellectual property protection was undoubtedly important to 
the country’s economic growth, the leaders cautiously avoided actions 
that would be viewed by their opponents or the larger public as 
kowtows to foreign interests.125 
Their cautious approach was understandable. Toward the end of 
President Jiang’s leadership, for example, he and Premier Zhu Rongji 
were heavily criticized for their friendly policies toward the United 
States.126 If Jiang and Zhu could be criticized by fellow leaders, one 
could only imagine how much more difficult it would be for the next 
generation of leaders to make decisions. 
Thus, when the fourth-generation leaders assumed key positions 
following the Sixteenth National Party Congress in November 2002, 
less than a year after China’s WTO accession,127 this group of new 
and young leaders were unsurprisingly wary of their participation in 
the international intellectual property debate—or, for that matter, the 
discussion of any international matters. After all, reformist leaders 
needed to consolidate power first before they could make bold moves 
in the international arena, which could draw severe criticism from 
their more conservative counterparts.128 
 
125 As Margaret Pearson observes: 
[T]he domestic political backlash to WTO accession and the political need for 
leaders to respond to the idea that China had been “sold out” by the stringent 
concessions to which its negotiators agreed are significant for China’s behavior in 
WTO. After accession, it became de rigueur in China to indicate that the country 
would not just incur obligations from WTO membership but also would “gain 
rights and benefits.” . . . [T]he need to respond to domestic criticism about China’s 
weakness in its WTO negotiations, the need to stand up to the United States in 
particular, and the need to use the “rights” afforded China by membership are key 
to many of the public position China has taken at the WTO. 
Pearson, supra note 85, at 246. 
126 See, e.g., Doyle McManus, Report Sharpens Edginess with China, L.A. TIMES, May 
26, 1999, at A18 (reporting that “[a]fter the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade, 
many Chinese criticized [Premier] Zhu [Rongji] and President Jiang Zemin—who have 
staked their foreign policy agenda on building a ‘strategic partnership’ with the United 
States—for cozying up to a country that they believe is eager to keep China down”). 
127 As Henry Kissinger points out, the fourth-generation leadership “represented the 
first generation of top officials without personal experience of the revolution, the first 
leaders in the Communist period to take office through constitutional processes—and the 
first to assume positions of national responsibility in a China unambiguously emerging as 
a great power.” KISSINGER, supra note 34, at 488. For in-depth discussions of the fourth-
generation leadership, see generally CHINA’S NEW RULERS: THE SECRET FILES (Bruce 
Gilley & Andrew Nathan eds., 2d ed. 2003); LI CHENG, CHINA’S LEADERS (2001); THE 
NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AFTER THE 16TH PARTY 
CONGRESS (Yun-han Chu et al. eds., 2004). 
128 See Lee H. Hamilton, Introduction to BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND 
AMERICAN INTERESTS 1, 7 (James R. Lilley & Wendell Lewis Willkie eds., 1994) (“[I]f  
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Fourth, when China joined the WTO, it made significant 
concessions in its accession agreements with the European Union, the 
United States, and other WTO member states. As a result, many of 
the obligations China assumed under those accession agreements are 
WTO-plus.129 In the intellectual property arena, for example, China 
was required to comply with the TRIPS Agreement from the 
inception of its membership, even though other middle-income 
countries, such as Brazil and India, benefited from the transitional 
period.130 Taking full advantage of that period, India did not offer 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products until 2005, four years 
after China’s accession.131 These WTO-plus commitments therefore 
rendered China’s position closer to that of the developed world, 
notwithstanding the fact that the country continued to identify itself as 
“the world’s largest developing country” and accrued strategic 
benefits by playing a leading role in the developing world.132 
Fifth, the Chinese economy is highly complex, and developments 
have been highly uneven—both geographically and across economic 
and technological sectors.133 As I have noted, such developments have 
 
Deng Xiaoping should die in the near future, there is some question whether his successors 
will be willing or able to take on tough policy issues while they jockey for political 
position. . . . It took Deng Xiao-ping over two years to achieve a dominant position after 
the death of Mao Zedong.”); China and the WTO, supra note 82, at 14 (remarks of Jerome 
Cohen, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law) (“[I]t is only when 
somebody achieves power at the top of the Chinese system that he may be free to say 
things that he did not feel he could say as number five, or four, or three, or two.”); see also 
id. at 4 (remarks of the Author) (“[R]ecent retirement of third-generation Chinese leaders, 
including Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and Li Peng, . . . could spark an internal battle over 
leadership succession.”); Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 10, at 1107 (“In 
China, the reformists are constantly challenged by their more conservative counterparts, 
who are uncomfortable with the country’s rapid socio-economic changes and the resulting 
social ills.”). 
129 See sources cited supra note 84. 
130 See TRIPS Agreement art. 65(2). 
131 See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 107, at 863. 
132 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 129. 
133 As I observed earlier: 
Although the subsequent founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 
helped centralize the country to a certain extent, strategic planning in the country’s 
formative years and the rapid economic development in China within the past two 
decades have led to greater economic development in certain parts of China at the 
expense of others. In Deng Xiaoping’s words, “some people have to get rich first.” 
As a result, there are now enormous disparities across the country in the levels of 
wealth and income, the purchasing power of local consumers, and the stages of 
economic and technological development. 
Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual 
Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 412, 421–22 (2008) (footnotes  
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resulted in the country’s taking a somewhat “schizophrenic” position 
in the international intellectual property arena.134 While China prefers 
to have stronger protection of intellectual property rights in 
entertainment, software, semiconductors, and selected areas of 
biotechnology, it remains reluctant to increase protection for 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs. Such 
preferences were the combined result of a huge population, the 
country’s continued economic dependence on agriculture, the leaders’ 
worries about public health issues, and the general concerns about the 
people’s overall well-being.135 As a result of its “schizophrenic” 
preferences, China is likely to be on the side of the developing world 
with respect to some issues, but on the side of the developed world 
with respect to others. 
In fact, the complex internal economic conditions have made it 
difficult for China to develop an effective national strategy. After all, 
strategies that work for major cities, like Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou, may not work for the countryside.136 Likewise, strategies 
that work for the prosperous coastal areas may not work for the poor 
rural west. Indeed, one of the biggest challenges for China is to come 
up with solutions that respond well to the country’s complex and 
divergent conditions and varying research and development 
capabilities. 
To complicate matters even further, rapid globalization and the 
increasing activities taken by the private sector, sub-state actors, and 
individuals have resulted in developments that include limited or no 
state action.137 As Chris Alden points out, sub-state actors in China, 
 
omitted). See generally Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 203–13 (discussing the wide 
regional and sectoral disparities in China). 
134 See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual 
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (explaining why intellectual 
property developments in China should not be analyzed as if the country were 
homogeneous). 
135 See id. at 26. 
136 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 74, at 963 (“[O]ne needs to 
recognize China as a ‘country of countries,’ rather than a homogenous one.”). 
137 See David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dynamics, 
in POWER SHIFT, supra note 112, at 1, 16 (noting in a model where its “core actor . . . is 
not the nation-state but a plethora of nonstate actors and processes—many of which are 
difficult to measure with any precision—that operate at the societal level”). As one 
commentator observes: 
[A]fter two decades of reform in China, of decentralisation and privatisation, 
Chinese strategies and presence in Africa are more of a mix of government 
initiatives and the endeavours of private enterprises and individuals. The ability of 
the Chinese government to regulate its enterprises and citizens aboard is limited,  
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such as provincial governments and municipal authorities, have 
undertaken major initiatives to establish formal and informal ties in 
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Angola, 
and Nigeria.138 It is also not uncommon to find friendship agreements 
or sister-city relationships between cities and provinces in China and 
other parts of the world,139 not to mention the large number of 
Chinese tourists and students who help boost their country’s visibility 
while establishing ties at the sub-state level.140 The country’s national 
strategy, therefore, is more complex than one would expect from a 
government that many have viewed simplistically as monolithic. 
Finally, China joined the WTO at a time when the country had yet 
to take a more assertive role in international regimes and multilateral 
organizations. Although China reestablished trade and diplomatic ties 
with the outside world more than three decades ago, it initially 
harbored a strong mistrust toward multilateral organizations. In fact it 
did not actively participate in multilateral organizations until the mid-
to-late 1990s.141 As Derek Mitchell describes: 
 
especially in this era of neoliberal globalisation. Therefore, it is important to 
appreciate that China is a heterogeneous grouping of various collective actors, i.e., 
the government, state enterprises, private enterprises and the public in general, and 
that the interests among the various actors within each sector might well differ. 
Luk Tak Chuen, Regulating China? Regulating Globalisation?, in CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN 
AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE 13, 14 (Dorothy-Grace 
Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008). 
138 See CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA: PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR HEGEMON? 29 
(2007). 
139 See, e.g., DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (AUSTL.), ACT’S TRADE WITH 
CHINA 1 (2008), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china_states.pdf; DEPT. 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (AUSTL.), NORTHERN TERRITORY’S TRADE WITH CHINA 
2 (2008), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china_states.pdf; DEPT. OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (AUSTL.), NSW’S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china_states.pdf; DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE (AUSTL.), QUEENSLAND’S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china_states.pdf; DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE (AUSTL.), TASMANIA’S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china_states.pdf; DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE (AUSTL.), VICTORIA’S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china_states.pdf; DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE (AUSTL.), WESTERN AUSTRALIA’S TRADE WITH CHINA 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/china_states.pdf. 
140 See Eric Heginbotham, Evaluating China’s Strategy Toward the Developing World, 
in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 117, at 189, 202. 
141 See id. at 189; see also BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE, supra note 86, at 223 (“As 
China has begun to think and act globally, it has had to adapt to an international system 
traditionally dominated and developed by the major Western powers. China is generally 
comfortable with the world’s major international institutions such as the United Nations 
and the World trade Organization . . . . With a professed commitment to international law,  
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Previously, China had been suspicious of multilateral structures that 
could potentially constrain Beijing’s sovereignty and independent 
action, but its perspective changed as Beijing became reassured of 
its ability to safeguard its sovereign interests in multilateral 
environments, and it gradually came to appreciate the international 
system’s benefits in addressing transnational challenges such as 
piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, and infectious disease. China 
further recognized the value of being at the table to shape the rules, 
rather than having the rules imposed upon it. Today, China is a 
member of more than 130 inter-governmental organizations, and 
has signed more than 250 international multilateral treaties.142 
As China takes on a greater leadership role in the international 
community, it has become more adept at and confident in handling 
international affairs through the multilateral process.143 Its 
participation in international organizations also increases as a result. 
III 
PHASE 2: TAKER AND SHAKER 
A.  China as a Norm Shaker 
In Phase 2, China continues to serve as a norm taker, similar to 
Phase 1. Nevertheless, the country also adds the new role of a norm 
shaker, seeking to test the boundaries and limits of international 
intellectual property norms. Having assumed this new role, China has 
become more actively involved in regime development while being 
 
equality of states, and democratization of international affairs, and eager to reassure the 
world of its responsible conduct and peaceful rise, China views these institutions as 
helpful in promoting its strategic goals and principles.”); Lawrence Freedman, China as a 
Global Strategic Actor, in DOES CHINA MATTER?, supra note 84, at 21, 22 (“[U]ntil 
comparatively recently, [China] has shown disinterest and often distrust in international 
treaties and the principles of multilateralism, fearing them as means by which it could be 
put on the spot. Over time, as its interests began to coincide more with those of its 
neighbours, or at least as it began to assert this to be the case, China began to understand 
how international organizations could be used to protect interests and put pressure on 
others. As a result it became more willing to sign up to international treaties and 
agreements . . . .”). 
142 BERGSTEN ET AL., THE BALANCE SHEET, supra note 113, at 139–40. For book-
length discussions of China’s participation in international organizations, see generally 
GERALD CHAN, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PARTICIPATION IN NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1971 (1989); CHINA JOINS THE WORLD, supra 
note 32; HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE 
IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1990). 
143 See Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China’s Regional Strategy, in POWER SHIFT, 
supra note 112, at 48, 59 (“Today, we can perhaps argue that China has largely completed 
its painful search for a national identity, thus becoming more confident of its relationships 
and its position in the region.”). 
238 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 13, 209 
more eager to explore its interests at both the multilateral and 
nonmultilateral levels. 
Within the WTO dispute settlement process, China often sat on the 
side of the respondent; it has yet to use the process aggressively. 
Since 2003, however, “China started to participate in almost all WTO 
cases as a third party.”144 While participation in this process is costly 
and time-consuming, it has enabled China to play a much better 
“WTO game.”145 The knowledge it acquired has come in handy when 
a complaint was filed against China, as in China—Measures Affecting 
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.146 
Such knowledge has also become more useful as China becomes 
more active in filing complaints against other WTO member states. 
Unlike other trade areas, in the intellectual property area China’s 
participation in the Doha Round was rather limited.147 The only major 
document it advanced at the WTO was the November 2006 
submission to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.148 
Highlighting the problematic overlap between patent protection and 
the development of standards, the submission declared: “[I]ncluding 
IPR into standards may have serious impact on the international 
standards setting efforts and the corresponding implementations. As 
TBT Agreement aims at boosting production efficiency and 
facilitating international trade by encouraging the adoption of 
 
144 Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO, supra note 114, at 73. 
145 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 10, at 1107–08 (“In addition to 
human resources, litigation capital, and legal capacities, a successful player will need more 
finely-honed skills and a deeper knowledge of the different facets of this game. The more 
a country plays the WTO game, the more familiar and better it will become.”); see also 
Qin, supra note 84, at 193–94 (noting that “Chinese trade lawyers . . . through 
representing China as a third party in scores of other WTO disputes, have gained much 
knowledge and experience in the WTO adjudication system.”). 
146 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007) 
[hereinafter WTO Complaint]; see also discussion infra text accompanying notes 156–67. 
For detailed analyses of this dispute, see generally Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 
supra note 10; Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011). 
147 See Qin, supra note 84, at 188 & n.94 (noting that China has submitted more than 
thirty proposals and position papers as part of the Doha Round negotiations). 
148 Communication from the People’s Republic of China, Intellectual Property Right 
(IPR) Issues in Standardization, G/TBT/W/251/Add.1 (Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter TBT 
Committee Submission]. For media reports on the submission, see generally China Seeks 
Dialogue on Link Between Standards, IPR in WTO, INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, Nov. 15, 
2006; William New, China Leads Developing Country Push for Balance in IP and 
Standards, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog 
/index.php?p=599. 
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international standards, such objectives can be frustrated and 
therefore international trade retarded.”149 China further “propose[d] 
that international standard setting bodies, as well as Members, 
provide the Committee with relevant information regarding practices 
and experience on their IPR policies in standardization for Members’ 
understanding and reference.”150 Although this submission was not as 
high-profile as, say, a proposal before the TRIPS Council, the 
submission suggests China’s growing interest in shaping, or shaking, 
international intellectual property norms. 
Earlier that year, China also joined a group of developing countries 
in cosponsoring a proposal to introduce a new Article 29bis into the 
TRIPS Agreement.151 The amended provision sought to create an 
obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of origin of the 
biological resources and traditional knowledge used in inventions.152 
Although the United States and Japan remain in strong opposition to 
this disclosure approach,153 the proposal has received wide support 
from a large number of developing countries.154 The proposal is also 
consistent with Article 26 of the recently amended Chinese Patent 
Law, which requires patent applicants to disclose the traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources used in their inventions.155 
In April 2007, the United States filed its first TRIPS complaint 
against China over the lack of protection and enforcement of 
 
149 TBT Committee Submission, supra note 148, ¶ 13. 
150 Id. ¶ 21. 
151 See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru, 
Thailand, and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme—The Outstanding Implementation Issue 
on the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006) [hereinafter Article 29bis Proposal]. 
152 See id. ¶ 2 (requiring patent applicants to “disclose the country providing the 
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country 
they were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin”). 
153 See Emanuela Arezzo, Struggling Around the “Natural” Divide: The Protection of 
Tangible and Intangible Indigenous Property, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 388 
(2007). See generally JOSHUA D. SARNOFF & CARLOS M. CORREA, ANALYSIS OF 
OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN REQUIREMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY APPLICATIONS (2006), U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2004/14, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted200514_en.pdf (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the introduction of a disclosure requirement). 
154 William New, WTO Biodiversity Amendment Backed; EU Seeks ‘New Thinking’ on 
GIs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index 
.php?p=802. 
155 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 26 (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 
2009) [hereinafter Amended Patent Law]. 
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intellectual property rights.156 Developed over more than two years,157 
the complaint focused on the following issues: (1) the high thresholds 
for criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual property area; 
(2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to properly dispose 
of infringing goods seized at the border; (3) the denial of copyright 
protection to works that have not been authorized for publication or 
dissemination within China; and (4) the unavailability of criminal 
procedures and penalties for infringing activities that involved either 
reproduction or distribution, but not both.158 By the time the WTO 
panel was established to address the complaint, the last claim had 
already been resolved.159 
Although China’s respondent role in this dispute did not provide 
much room for “shaking” international intellectual property norms, it 
admirably defended its position before the WTO and succeeded in 
defeating half of the claims brought by the United States.160 More 
importantly, even though the panel ultimately found its laws 
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement, China was able to score 
some important points that have the potential for influencing the 
future interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.161 
For example, the panel report underscores both the importance of 
having minimum standards and flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement 
and the longstanding treatment of intellectual property rights as 
private rights.162 It also rejects the use of bilateral, plurilateral, or 
regional trade agreements to divine meaning in the TRIPS 
language.163 In addition, the panel shows its appreciation of the 
divergent local market conditions in each WTO member while 
continuing the use of an evidence-based approach for resolving WTO 
 
156 WTO Complaint, supra note 146. 
157 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 74, at 904–05 (noting that trade 
groups have begun urging the USTR to file a WTO complaint against China concerning 
inadequate intellectual property protection since February 2005). 
158 See WTO Complaint, supra note 146. 
159 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 10, at 1055. 
160 See Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 8.1. 
161 See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, supra note 146, at 744–81 
(identifying six areas in which the WTO panel report has enabled developing countries to 
score some important points in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement). 
162 See id. at 744–54 (discussing the panel’s emphasis on the importance of the TRIPS 
minimum standards and on the Agreement’s recognition that “intellectual property rights 
are private rights”). 
163 See id. at 754–57 (discussing the panel’s refusal to treat subsequently-negotiated 
U.S. free trade agreements as subsequent agreements within the meaning of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
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disputes.164 The panel’s discussion of Article 41.5 also hints at its 
willingness to consider evidence in cases where resource demands in 
the area of intellectual property enforcement have exceeded those in 
other areas of law enforcement.165 Compared with India—Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products,166 the first TRIPS dispute between a developed country and 
a developing country, the U.S.-China dispute demonstrates the 
significant progress China and its developing country supporters have 
made.167 
A year after the release of this panel decision, China joined India in 
registering concerns about the development of TRIPS-plus 
enforcement standards at the June 2010 TRIPS Council meeting. 
Their timely interventions were made largely in response to the 
release of the draft text of the highly controversial Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement168 (ACTA) and in view of concerns 
over the ongoing, disturbing development of bilateral, plurilateral, 
and regional trade agreements.169 As China explained, the TRIPS-plus 
enforcement standards could cause a wide variety of systemic 
problems within the international trading system.170 For instance, the 
higher standards could spark potential legal conflicts with the TRIPS 
Agreement as well as with other WTO agreements.171 By increasing 
the complexity of intellectual property standards, they could also 
 
164 See id. at 757–63 (discussing the panel’s appreciation of local conditions and its 
demands for substantive, as opposed to anecdotal, evidence). 
165 See id. at 778–81 (discussing the panel’s interpretation of Article 41.5 of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
166 Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report, India—Patent Protection 
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998). 
167 In this dispute, developing countries have played a much larger role. Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey all participated in the panel proceedings as 
third parties. Panel Report, supra note 9, ¶ 1.6. Except for India and Turkey, all of these 
countries also either provided a written submission to or made an oral statement before the 
WTO panel. 
168 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011 
[hereinafter ACTA], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc 
_147937.pdf. ACTA is a plurilateral agreement that seeks to set a new and higher 
benchmark for intellectual property enforcement among like-minded countries. See 
generally Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 
(2011) (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA). 
169 See TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting ¶¶ 250, 264, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Council, Minutes]. 
170 See id. ¶¶ 248–63. China’s June 9 statement was reprinted as The Problems with the 
“TRIPS plus” Enforcement Trend: China’s View, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 13. 
171 See TRIPS Council, Minutes, supra note 169, ¶¶ 252–53. 
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make the international legal framework highly unpredictable, thereby 
posing barriers to legitimate trade.172 
Moreover, the TRIPS-plus standards may upset the delicate 
balance struck in the TRIPS Agreement through an arduous multiyear 
negotiation process.173 The standards could also build harmful 
technological barriers while raising concerns about resource 
misallocation,174 an issue previously raised in the recent U.S.-China 
TRIPS enforcement dispute.175 
To conclude its intervention, China advanced a proposal on 
specific safeguard principles against the ongoing push for TRIPS-plus 
enforcement standards.176 These principles included: 
(i) the [intellectual property] chapter or provisions of [a regional 
trade agreement, free trade agreement] or regional agreement to 
which a WTO Member was party shall not be inconsistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement of WTO; (ii) the enforcement of IPRs shall not 
create distortive effects on legitimate international trade; and (iii) no 
WTO Member shall be restrained from the autonomy for utilizing 
its public enforcement resources.177 
Outside the WTO, China has had active participation in WIPO. In 
addition to those treaties China joined in the 1980s and 1990s,178 
China is now a member of the Singapore Treaty on the Law of 
Trademarks (Singapore Treaty), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (See Table 1). The latter 
two treaties were key concerns of the United States and its intellectual 
property rights holders. As the USTR stated in the 2005 National 
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, “[t]he United 
States considers the WIPO treaties to reflect many key international 
norms for providing copyright protection over the Internet, . . . [and] 
China’s accession to the WIPO treaties is an increasingly important 
priority for the United States.”179 
 
172 See id. ¶ 254. 
173 See id. ¶ 255. 
174 See id. ¶¶ 256–58. 
175 See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, supra note 146, at 727, 
778–81 (discussing China’s arguments in relation to Article 41.5 of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
176 See TRIPS Council, Minutes, supra note 169, ¶ 259. 
177 Id. 
178 See discussion supra Part I. 
179 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 2, at 96. 
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China has also been active in hosting intergovernmental 
conferences for WIPO, at both the international and regional levels.180 
The International Symposium on Geographical Indications in Beijing 
in June 2007 provides a good example.181 In addition, China for the 
first time obtained a senior leadership position within WIPO. In 
December 2006, Wang Binying, who joined the WIPO Bureau for 
Development Cooperation for Asia and the Pacific in 1992 as a senior 
program officer, became the first Chinese national to serve as the 
organization’s assistant director general.182 Three years later, she was 
promoted to the deputy director general position, taking charge of 
matters related to trademarks, industrial designs, and geographical 
indications.183 
At the nonmultilateral level, the State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) has also been quite active in developing professional ties with 
patent offices from around the world. In 2007, for example, SIPO 
officials met with their counterparts from the European Patent Office, 
the Japanese Patent Office, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, 
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office to discuss ways to 
“improv[e] the efficiency of their examination systems and to 
harmonize their office systems.”184 These so-called “IP5” discussions 
further strengthened SIPO’s status as “a player in the top tier of patent 
offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent 
administration.”185 
 
180 See Search Meetings and Documents, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en 
/archive_meeting.jsp (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (select “China” in the “Select Country” 
drop-down menu and perform a search) (providing a list of WIPO meetings held in 
China); see also Pearson, supra note 85, at 257 (“Chinese attempts at leadership are 
primarily exhibited as a desire to host major meetings, such as they will do for the 
Olympics in 2008.”). 
181 See Conferences, Meetings and Seminars, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en 
/details.jsp?meeting_id=13243 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (providing information about 
the International Symposium on Geographical Indications). 
182 Press Release, WIPO, Member States Approve Appointment of Top Management 
Team (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/prdocs/2006 
/wipo_pr_2006_449.html. 
183 Press Release, WIPO, Member States Endorse Senior Appointments (June 16, 
2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2009/article_0016.html. 
184 PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES 
AND THEIR CLIENTS 236 (2010). 
185 Id. at 233; see also id. (noting that the Chinese Patent Office, and later SIPO, has 
served as an international searching authority for PCT purposes since 1994). 
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Taking the lead from the United States and the European Union,186 
China further established bilateral trade agreements with Chile, 
Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, and Costa Rica.187 
Additional agreements with Australia, the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates), Iceland, South Africa, and the South Africa 
Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland) are under discussion.188 
In addition, China established a set of regional agreements with 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),189 
including a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the 
intellectual property field.190 China is also exploring greater economic 
cooperation with India, with the hope of eventually developing a 
regional trade agreement.191 If such developments continue, China 
may be able to greatly strengthen its collaboration on intellectual 
property matters within Asia. Together with India and ASEAN, China 
may even be able to develop a “normative community” that has 
enough political clout to rival the United States or the European 
Union.192 
 
186 See generally FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES (Jeffrey 
J. Schott ed., 2004) (providing an excellent collection of articles discussing U.S. free trade 
agreements). 
187 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 119, at 957–58. 
188 See id. at 958. 
189 Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation Between China and ASEAN, ASEAN-China, Aug. 15, 2009, 
available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/inforimages/200908/20090817113007764.pdf; 
Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the 
People’s Republic of China, ASEAN-China, Jan. 14, 2007, available at http://www.asean 
.org/19346.htm; Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the People’s Republic of China, ASEAN-China, Nov. 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.asean.org/16646.htm; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Co-operation Between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China, ASEAN-China, Nov. 
4, 2002, available at http://www.asean.org/13196.htm. 
190 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of 
China on Cooperation in the Field of Intellectual Property, ASEAN-China, Dec. 21, 2009, 
available at http://www.asean.org/15thsummit/Mou-China-IP-Eng.pdf. 
191 Jim Yardley, Indian Leader in China Urges Closer Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, 
at A8. 
192 See Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, supra note 27 (discussing the 
potential for linking China, India, and ASEAN together as a single normative community 
named Chindiasean); see also SIMON TAY, ASIA ALONE: THE DANGEROUS POST-CRISIS  
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Although intellectual property remains a non-crucial item in 
China’s bilateral, plurilateral, and regional agreements and the 
intellectual property provisions in these agreements differ 
significantly,193 these agreements do include provisions showing 
China’s eagerness to shape intellectual property relationships with its 
trading partners. The agreement with New Zealand, for example, 
recognizes the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural 
expressions,194 thereby paving the way for greater support of both the 
Article 29bis proposal, which China cosponsored, and the third and 
recent amendments to the Chinese patent law.195 The agreement with 
Peru also includes an annex concerning the protection of twenty-two 
geographical indications originating from China (See Table 2), an 
intellectual property area that is just beginning to emerge in the 
country. 
  
 
DIVIDE FROM AMERICA 150 (2010) (advancing the concept of “Asia’s normative 
community”). 
193 As I wrote earlier: 
In the intellectual property area, there are significant variations among the different 
[sinic trade agreements]. The New Zealand–China Free Trade Agreement 
(“NZCFTA”) includes a lengthy chapter on intellectual property protection. By 
contrast, the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which was signed after the 
NZCFTA, does not mention intellectual property protection at all. Likewise, 
although the Chile-China Free Trade Agreement mentions the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement on Public Health and identifies as an important goal the 
prevention of abuse of intellectual property rights and restraints on competition, the 
NZCFTA omits both issues. 
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 119, at 1011 (footnote omitted). 
194 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China art. 165, N.Z.-China, Apr. 7, 2008, 
available at http://chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0                 
-downloads/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf (“Subject to each Party’s international 
obligations, the Parties may establish appropriate measures to protect genetic resources, 
traditional knowledge and folklore.”). 
195 See Article 29bis Proposal, supra note 151; Amended Patent Law, supra note 155, 
art. 26. 
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TABLE 2. List of Chinese geographical indications included in the China-
Peru Free Trade Agreement 
1.  Anxi Tie Guanyin (Tieh-Kuan-Yin) Tea 安溪铁观音  
2.  Shaoxing (Yellow) Wine 绍兴酒  
3. Fuling Pickled Mustard Tuber 涪陵榨菜  
4. (Ningxia) Zhongning Matrimony Vine（宁夏）中宁枸杞  
5. Jingdezhen Porcelain 景德镇瓷器  
6. Zhenjiang Aromatic Vinegar 镇江香醋  
7. Pu’er Tea 普洱茶  
8. (Xihu) Longjing Tea （西湖）龙井茶  
9. Kinghwa (Jinhua) Ham 金华火腿  
10. Shanxi Mature Vinegar 山西老陈醋  
11. Xuanwei Ham 宣威火腿  
12. Longquan Celadon 龙泉青瓷  
13. Yixing Dark-red Enameled Pottery 宜兴紫砂陶  
14. Korla Fragrant Pear 库尔勒香梨  
15. Min County Tang-Kuei (Chinese angelica root) 岷县当归  
16. Wenshan Notoginseng 文山三七  
17. Wuchang Rice 五常大米  
18. Tongjiang White Fungus 通江银耳  
19. Bama Miniature Pig 八马香猪  
20. Taihe Blackbone Chicken 泰和乌鸡  
21. Fuding Shaddock 福鼎四季柚  
22. (Nanjing) Cloud-pattern Brocade （南京）云锦 
 
Source: Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Peru, Annex 10, 
China-Peru, Apr. 28, 2009, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex 
/bilu_fujian10_en.pdf. 
 
B.  An Enhanced Profile 
In Phase 1, China kept a rather low profile in the international 
intellectual property regime. In Phase 2, however, China is slowly 
adding the role of a norm shaker. This more assertive role is 
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consistent with the Chinese leadership’s growing awareness of the 
economic and strategic importance of a well-functioning intellectual 
property system.196 Such growing awareness was indeed the impetus 
behind the State Council’s recent adoption of a pioneering National 
Intellectual Property Strategy.197 Adopted in June 2008, this new 
strategy provides a comprehensive plan to improve the protection and 
management of intellectual property rights. Of particular emphasis is 
the active development of homegrown or self-driven intellectual 
property (zizhu zhishi chanquan).198 
Although this new strategy does not speak to China’s role in the 
international intellectual property regime, it is not hard to understand 
why China needs to assume a more assertive role in that regime. First, 
a greater focus on international norm-setting will help China fight off 
external pressure from the European Union and the United States. 
Every year, the USTR’s Section 301 process subjects China to 
heightened scrutiny. While the process focuses on questionable, self-
reported data supplied by industry groups,199 it is hard to ignore the 
heavy pressure the process has placed on the Chinese government and 
the harm the process’s findings have inflicted on China’s international 
reputation. Because the WTO does not allow a member state to 
pursue retaliatory actions until it has exhausted all of the remedies 
permissible under its rules,200 the Section 301 process is often used as 
a “shaming” tool, except in relation to issues lying outside the scope 
of the WTO, such as those found in TRIPS-plus trade and investment 
agreements.201 
 
196 As President Hu Jintao remarked in the Group Study of the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee of CPC in May 2006: “Strengthening the building of China’s system of 
intellectual property right and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, management, 
protection and application regarding intellectual property are our urgent need[s] for the 
purpose of enhancing independent and self-driven innovation capabilities and building an 
innovation-oriented country.” Wu, supra note 85, at 120; see also Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners, supra note 28, at 189–96 (discussing the need to convince Chinese leaders of the 
benefits of intellectual property protection). 
197 STATE COUNCIL, COMPENDIUM OF CHINA NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGY (2008). 
198 See id. ¶ 7; see also Wu, supra note 85, at 121 (discussing the importance of “self-
driven” intellectual property). 
199 See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 7–8 (2010) 
(questioning the accuracy and reliability of industry-supplied figures). 
200 See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
201 See Vicki Allums, Special 301: TRIPS-Plus—Alive and Kicking, 5 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 651 (2006) (discussing TRIPS-plus trade commitments in relation 
to the Section 301 process). 
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Moreover, as the recent WTO disputes between China and the 
United States have shown, China is likely to continue to face pressure 
from the United States through the WTO dispute settlement process. 
Although China has a strong preference for consultation and 
conciliation,202 the United States embraces a legalistic approach and 
considers the WTO dispute settlement process a means to address 
disagreement and ensure rule compliance. In fact, the recent dispute 
on the lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights may 
represent only the beginning of a series of complaints that the United 
States (and its industries) intend to bring against China before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
Second, China has significant internal needs, and a well-
functioning intellectual property system may help the country meet 
those needs.203 At the micro level, such a system will help provide the 
incentives needed for indigenous industries to develop. Indeed, it is 
no surprise that the new National Intellectual Property Strategy 
focuses considerably on homegrown intellectual property. At the 
 
202 Such preference is particularly clear in the first few years of China’s membership. 
As Julia Qin observes: 
In the first several years after accession, China showed a clear preference for 
handling trade conflicts through negotiation rather than WTO adjudication. . . . 
China settled the first WTO complaint against it through consultations, even though 
the legal issues involved were not clear-cut. When threatened with WTO litigation 
on several occasions during this initial period, China had opted to compromise so 
as to avoid formal WTO complaints. 
Qin, supra note 84, at 192 (footnote omitted); cf. CHIU, supra note 30, at 75–76 (noting 
that “Communist China consider[ed] “negotiation” the most appropriate method of settling 
questions of treaty interpretation” in the early days of the People’s Republic). 
Nevertheless, China’s “litigation avoidance” strategy began to change in 2006. See Qin, 
supra note 84, at 193. Professor Qin attributed this change to two different reasons: 
First of all, the significance of the Chinese interests involved in [the post-2005 
cases] makes compromises less palatable. The several pending complaints against 
China . . . challenge important aspects of the Chinese system, and the U.S. 
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations in the Chinese paper case may 
set a precedent that can potentially affect Chinese exports broadly. Second, it 
appears that there has been a change of mentality among Chinese decision-makers. 
In the past they were highly concerned about losing a WTO case, regarding the loss 
of WTO litigation as a matter of political defeat. But over time the decision-makers 
seem to have realized that China cannot always avoid WTO disputes through 
political manoeuvres and that it needs to embrace WTO litigation as a normal way 
of resolving disputes. Contributing to this change of mentality is the growing 
confidence of Chinese trade lawyers who, through representing China as a third 
party in scores of other WTO disputes, have gained much knowledge and 
experience in the WTO adjudication system. 
Id. at 193–94. 
203 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 193–202 (discussing the development of 
local intellectual property stakeholders and the shift toward an export-driven economy). 
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macro level, a well-functioning intellectual property system can help 
attract more foreign direct investment, which will be beneficial to the 
local economy.204 The growing investment, in turn, may lead to 
greater transfer of technology and knowledge, creation of more local 
jobs, accelerated development of human capital, and generation of 
increased tax revenues.205 
Third, as the recent summit of the G–20 economies has shown, 
China is now in a position to assume greater leadership in the 
developing world.206 China is also playing increasingly important 
roles in such international fora as WIPO and the WTO.207 Indeed, it 
would be highly beneficial for China to develop a louder voice in 
both the developing world and the international community.208 As 
Peter Drahos cautions us, although Brazil and India historically have 
taken leadership roles in the developing world in the intellectual 
property arena, it is unclear whether they “are prepared to provide the 
general leadership on intellectual property issues that they once 
did.”209 If these countries fail to assume past leadership roles, China 
will be presented with an unprecedented opportunity to become more 
assertive at the international level. Even if China chooses not to 
provide visible leadership for developing countries, it could still work 
closely with Brazil and India to push for standards and policies that 
would benefit the developing world.210 
 
204 Commentators have widely noted the ambiguous relationship between intellectual 
property protection and foreign direct investment. See id. at 176–80 (providing a review of 
economic literature documenting such a relationship). Nevertheless, China has strong 
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Finally, a more assertive role in the international intellectual 
property arena can help China develop international norms that 
benefit the country in either its negotiation of future international 
intellectual property treaties or its resolution of intellectual property-
related WTO disputes. International treaties are generally negotiated 
in the shadow of existing international norms.211 By developing 
norms that are beneficial to local development, China will pave the 
way for establishing international treaties that take account of local 
conditions. The development of these norms may also affect the 
interpretation of international treaties to which China is a party—
either in the form of subsequent developments or through the 
development of customary international law.212 By clarifying or 
spelling out limits to the country’s international obligations, a greater 
role in international norm-setting activities would most certainly 
benefit China. 
IV 
PHASE 3: TAKER, SHAKER, AND MAKER 
Phase 3 takes place when China assumes the additional role of a 
norm maker. With respect to norms that already exist, it is unclear 
when China will take on the new role of a norm maker, as opposed to 
staying in its role of a norm shaker. After all, norm shaking and norm 
making represent two sides of the same coin. A norm that has been 
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Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 459, 477 (2004) (discussing how 
countries can negotiate trade rules “in the shadow of” the WTO dispute settlement 
process); see also Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? 
Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 219, 220 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) (arguing that 
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212 See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 13, 56 (2006). 
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shaken up and transformed will necessarily result in the making of a 
new norm. Examples of when norm shaking and norm making may 
overlap are the introduction of a requirement for the disclosure of 
traditional knowledge and genetic resources, the strengthening of the 
protection for geographical indications in areas that go beyond just 
wines and spirits, and the adjustment of intellectual property 
enforcement standards based on enforcement capabilities, resource 
constraints, and local needs and conditions.213 
When the implicated norms have not been made or fully 
formalized, however, it is much easier to notice China’s role as a 
norm maker. After all, there is no need to shake up old norms before 
new ones can be developed. If old norms are displaced, the 
displacement usually does not stem from a direct conflict between old 
and new norms in the same space. Rather, it takes place when the new 
norms spill over into areas into which old norms are expanding. 
Examples of areas in which new norms could be made are global 
climate change, protection for alternative forms of innovation, models 
that take into account the uneven economic and technological 
developments in developing countries, and new norms addressing 
abuse of rights and restraints on trade.214 
Given the murky distinction between norm shaking and norm 
making, it may be rather hard to determine conclusively whether 
Phase 3 has already begun. In fact, China could have a very long 
Phase 2, making Phase 3 only a possibility in the remote future.215 In 
short, whether Phase 3 has already begun is a matter of interpretation. 
Nevertheless, challenges in demarcating periods and eras abound. For 
example, historians and social scientists have wondered whether a 
century includes exactly 100 years.216 What is really important for our 
purposes is not to pinpoint exactly when Phase 2 will end and when 
Phase 3 will begin. Rather, we should think more about the role China 
will play in this final phase. 
As I have noted elsewhere, once China has reached a “crossover 
point” where stronger protection is in its self-interest, it will demand 
 
213 See Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, supra note 27. 
214 See id. 
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216 See, e.g., ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 
1914–1991, at ix (1996) (considering 1914–1991 as the “short twentieth century”); 
KISSINGER, supra note 34, at 502 (suggesting that “China’s period of weakness and 
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drawn to a close” following the opening of the 2008 Beijing Olympics). 
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stronger protection of intellectual property rights.217 Similar demands 
have already been made by the United States and Japan, both of 
which were once major pirating nations. 
In the nineteenth century, the United States was heavily criticized 
for its lack of protection of foreign authors, ranging from Charles 
Dickens to Anthony Trollope to Gilbert and Sullivan.218 Although the 
United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1989,219 it had 
greatly improved its protection of foreign authors since the late 
nineteenth century, thanks to the emergence of a critical mass of local 
authors.220 Today, the United States actively champions the cause for 
greater protection of copyrighted works throughout the world. 
Likewise, Japan was heavily criticized by the United States and 
other developed countries for free riding on the efforts of foreign 
inventors.221 Japan and the United States were at the brink of a trade 
war in the late 1970s and early 1980s.222 Notwithstanding these initial 
missteps, the protection of intellectual property rights dramatically 
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Massey, supra note 55, at 233. 
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improved in Japan in the past three decades. During the Uruguay 
Round, Japan was an indispensable ally of the United States and the 
European Communities in pushing for the establishment of the TRIPS 
Agreement.223 A few years ago, Japan even proposed an anti-
counterfeiting treaty to provide a new and higher benchmark for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. This agreement has 
recently been adopted in the form of ACTA, with Japan serving as the 
treaty depositary.224 
If China follows the precedents set by the United States and Japan, 
its economic and technological conditions will eventually reach a 
crossover point where the country considers it to be in its self-
interests to provide stronger protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. Once China has reached that point, it will 
not only offer stronger protection and enforcement within the country 
but will also demand other countries to do the same—similar to the 
European Union, the United States, and Japan. In fact, there is no 
guarantee that China will want the same intellectual property regime 
as the one enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement or other international 
intellectual property treaties.225 There is actually a very good chance 
that China may want something quite different from what we have 
today—“something that builds upon [its] historical traditions and 
cultural backgrounds and that takes account of [its] drastically 
different socio-economic conditions.”226 
Consider, for example, the protection of copyrighted works in the 
digital environment. Such protection, or the lack thereof, is of great 
importance to China, a country with the world’s largest Internet 
population of 485 million users.227 As its Internet population 
continues to grow, the country will be able to exert more influence on 
developments in Internet law and policy across the world. As I have 
noted often, the important question about the Internet in China is not 
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only how the Internet will change China but also how China will 
change the Internet.228 
Notwithstanding the growing importance of Internet-related 
developments in China, the digital copyright norms it favors may be 
quite different from those found in the United States or other 
developed countries. To begin with, a substantial portion of Chinese 
Internet users are school- or college-age students,229 due in large part 
to the country’s late economic development and relative technological 
backwardness. As the China Internet Network Information Center 
officially reported, Internet users aged below thirty made up of close 
to sixty percent of the total Internet population in July 2011.230 
Because any law and policy relating to the Internet is likely to have a 
substantial impact on the future pillars of Chinese society,231 the 
stakes for Internet law reforms may be higher than those for other 
type of intellectual property law reform. 
Moreover, China continues to exert heavy control over the flow of 
information within society. Indeed, the country has been widely used 
as the poster child for Internet censorship,232 even though such 
censorship occurs elsewhere,233 including many developed 
countries.234 Ironically from the intellectual property standpoint, and 
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disturbingly from the human rights standpoint, censorship regimes 
may provide the much-needed infrastructure to strengthen 
enforcement in the digital environment. China therefore may offer an 
interesting alternative model that does not exist in Western 
democracies, notwithstanding the fact that such a model may not sit 
well with the free speech, free press, and privacy values in the latter 
group of countries.235 
Another example concerns the protection of alternative forms of 
innovation. The existing intellectual property system, as enshrined in 
the TRIPS Agreement and the Eurocentric Paris and Berne 
Conventions, focuses primarily on path breaking creations and 
innovations. However, sequential and cumulative innovations have 
been the driver of economic growth in many developing countries.236 
For example, utility models or petty patents remain an important 
feature of the intellectual property systems in these countries.237 As 
Assafa Endeshaw describes: 
[Within Asia, t]here are different approaches towards minor 
inventions and their terms of protection as well as that for patents. 
Thus Indonesia accords protection to small product improvements 
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through a ‘Simple Patent’ (obviously a ‘petty patent’) for one time 
of five years. Vietnam, on the other hand, grants protection for 
‘Utility Solutions’ for six years. By contrast, Malaysia recognizes 
‘Utility Innovations’ for a period of five years but renewable for a 
further five. The Philippines recognizes design patents (which 
include utility models) and protects them for five years, too, but 
with a possibility of renewals for two consecutive periods of five 
years.238 
In its 2010 annual report, SIPO reported that China had received 
5,433,189 applications from 2003 to 2010.239 Out of these 
applications, utility models accounted for 1,650,389 applications, 
about a third of the total applications.240 The ratio between utility 
models applied by the locals and those applied by foreigners is about 
99:1.241 
In recent years, a shanzhai culture has emerged in China, raising 
challenging questions about the acceptable boundaries of sequential 
and cumulative innovation.242 While many intellectual property rights 
holders and commentators consider the shanzhai phenomenon highly 
undesirable, shanzhai products do offer some benefits, especially 
when the products provide improvements that otherwise would not 
occur. In a world where intellectual property rights holders are 
sometimes reluctant to undertake innovation, shanzhai products may 
provide the much-needed “work around” to further technological 
developments. In addition, shanzhai products may provide an 
efficient means for China to catch up with its more developed trading 
partners. By enabling citizens to avoid paying monopoly prices, those 
products may also allow the Chinese to appropriate the consumers’ 
surplus.243 
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More importantly, the continued development of shanzhai products 
may suggest the existence of an alternative path of innovation.244 Like 
the Beijing Consensus,245 China’s innovation models may attract the 
attention of other countries that are working hard to catch up with the 
developed world. Indeed, commentators have already begun to 
appreciate the different forms of innovation that are slowly emerging 
in China. While Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson discuss what they 
have called “cost innovation,”246 Tan Yinglan focuses his recent book 
on “process innovation.”247 
Moreover, like norms identified with the “Beijing Consensus,” 
“China’s growing influence on accepted international [intellectual 
property] norms and principles need not be explicit to have an 
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impact.”248 As Derek Mitchell reminds us in the non–intellectual 
property context, “the Chinese development model has gained 
currency simply because of China’s apparent success, and the 
attractiveness of China’s hands-off standards-free policy to 
authoritarian leaders and even some populations tired of perceived 
heavy-handedness and condescension from Western aid donors.”249 
Indeed, if China’s phenomenal success in the science and technology 
areas continues, one has to wonder whether countries will begin to 
consider China’s model as a viable alternative. If these countries do 
so, Europe and the United States will face a formidable alternative for 
the first time since the end of the Cold War.250 
In sum, the opportunities for China to make new international 
intellectual property norms or shape them to its benefit remain wide 
open. If China moves into Phase 3 at full speed, the international 
intellectual property regime we will have in the future is likely to be 
very different from the one we have today. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article outlines the path of norm engagement China has taken 
in the international intellectual property arena. Although piracy and 
counterfeiting remain major problems within the country, China is not 
the traditional norm breaker one typically infers from its 
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disappointing record of intellectual property protection. Instead, the 
country has been a norm taker for most of its participation in the 
international intellectual property regime. As its strength, experience, 
and self-confidence grow, it slowly assumes the additional roles of a 
norm shaker and a norm maker. 
Studying China’s path of norm engagement is important because it 
enables us to ask important questions about the success and 
limitations of the international intellectual property regime. Can the 
TRIPS Agreement and other international intellectual property 
treaties provide meaningful protection to intellectual property rights 
holders in China? Are China’s existing piracy and counterfeiting 
problems caused by its inadequate compliance with these 
agreements? Or are they caused instead by deficiencies in the 
agreements? Regardless of the reason, what could we do to improve 
the agreements to ensure greater protection of authors and inventors? 
These are all questions important to intellectual property rights 
holders and their supportive governments. Indeed, the lack of success 
in using multilateral agreements to strengthen intellectual property 
protection and enforcement has led policymakers, industries, and 
commentators to push for greater use of nonmultilateral 
arrangements, including ACTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, which is still under negotiation.251 Rights holders have 
also actively explored the use of extra-legal measures, such as 
restrictive contracts, technological measures, and private ordering, to 
obtain what they could not through international treaties.252 
One question that policymakers, industries, and commentators 
have rarely explored is what will happen if the economic and 
technological conditions in China continue to improve to the point 
that the TRIPS Agreement and other international intellectual 
property treaties will favor China at the expense of the European 
Union, Japan, the United States, and other existing intellectual 
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ordering among intellectual property rights holders and Internet service providers); Peter 
K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in 4 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 73, 91–96 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing the trend of rights holders 
using mass-market contracts and technological protection measures). 
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property powers.253 This scenario seems far-fetched to many. 
However, given China’s rapid economic rise and its many notable 
developments in the science and technology areas,254 it is only a 
matter of time before China becomes a major intellectual property 
power with a considerable amount of homegrown intellectual 
property. 
Today, China is already among the top five countries filing patent 
applications through the PCT.255 In 2010, the number of PCT 
applications increased by 56.2% to 12,337, moving China to the 
fourth spot, behind only the United States, Japan, and Germany.256 
With significant backing of the Chinese government and significant 
involvement of a large public sector, China may be able to catch up 
with the existing intellectual property powers more quickly than one 
expects. Indeed, if China successfully reaches the 2015 goals set by 
SIPO: 
The annual quantity of applying for patents for inventions, utility 
models and designs [in the country] will reach 2 million. China will 
rank among the top two in the world in terms of the annual number 
of patents for inventions granted to the domestic applicants, and the 
quality of patents filed will further improve. The number of owning 
 
253 As John Orcutt and Hong Shen recently observed, China has made the following 
notable achievements in space technology, biotechnology (including genomics and stem 
cell research), information technology, nanotechnology, and advanced energy technology: 
• China is one of only three countries to put a person in space with its own rockets 
(and China recently conducted its first spacewalk). 
• Chinese research teams helped to map the genome for rice and have since helped 
to extend genomic sequencing to other plants, as well as a variety of insects and 
parasites. 
• China passed the United States as the leading exporter of information-technology 
goods in 2004. 
• China has become a world leader in the field of nanotechnology—producing 
major nanotechnology breakthroughs (e.g., improved production of carbon nano-
tubes) and generating a significant portion of the world’s nanotechnology 
publications and patents and new nanotechnology firms. 
• China has long been a leader in nuclear technology and is positioned to become a 
leader in a number of other energy fields, including clean coal and hydropower. 
JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION vii–ix (2011). 
254 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 55, at 185–88 (tracing the development of the 
intellectual property regime in China); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 74, at 
975–99 (examining the progress China has made in the intellectual property area). 
255 Press Release, World Intellectual. Prop. Org., International Patent Filings Recover 
in 2010 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011 
/article_0004.html. 
256 Id. The figures for the United States, Japan, and Germany are 44,855, 32,156, and 
17,171, respectively. 
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patents every one million people and the number of overseas patent 
applications filed by Chinese applicants will double. The proportion 
of patent applications in industrial enterprises above designated size 
will reach 8% and the quantity of owning patent rights will 
significantly rise. . . . The patent transaction services will be 
established in major cities of China with annual patent transaction 
amounts reaching 100 billion yuan. . . . The patent examiner[s] will 
reach 9,000. . . . The talents in the patent service industry will be 
greater and the professional categories will be more complete, with 
certified patent agents reaching 10,000.257 
Moreover, macroeconomic structures are constantly changing. In 
the near future, the economic structure of the United States—and for 
that matter, the European Union, Japan, or other existing developed 
countries—could depend more on innovation than existing forms of 
intellectual property rights. If firms like Apple, Google, and Facebook 
are, indeed, driving the U.S. economy, as opposed to, say, the U.S. 
film and pharmaceutical industries, one has to wonder how much the 
existing international intellectual property system will still benefit the 
United States.258 
Finally, norms and values in the international intellectual property 
regime are highly dynamic. As with most areas in the international 
regulatory system, intellectual property norms are not developed in a 
vacuum. Virtually all international intellectual property agreements 
reflect compromises struck between and among key negotiating 
parties. Thus, the role China will play in the international intellectual 
property regime will also depend on the roles the European Union, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, the United States, and others 
will play. The more we understand China’s participation in the 
international intellectual property regime and its role in the WTO and 
 
257 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE (CHINA), NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY (2011–2020) 3 (2011), translated at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages 
/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf; see also Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, 
Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02 
/business/02unboxed.html (stating that USPTO Director David Kappos described SIPO’s 
2015 targets as “mind-blowing numbers”). 
258 As Christopher May writes: 
[A]s the balance of technical leadership starts to move, perhaps accelerated by the 
impact of the recession on research and innovation in the most-developed countries 
(the US, Europe, and Japan), it is not clear that those states that previously argued 
for robust protection of IPRs will necessarily find themselves so advantaged by the 
current settlement. If the TRIPs agreement and the work of WIPO has largely in the 
past privileged the interests and benefits of the technological leaders in the global 
economy, what happens when this leadership starts to shift? 
Christopher May, Afterword to IMPLEMENTING WIPO’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra 
note 210, at 172. 
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WIPO, the clearer and more nuanced picture we will have of what the 
future will hold for this particular regime. 
 
